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Abstract
Recent work on adversarial examples has demonstrated that most natural inputs can
be perturbed to fool even state-of-the-art machine learning systems. But does this
happen for humans as well? In this work, we investigate what fraction of natural
instances of speech can be turned into “illusions” which either alter humans’
perception or result in different people having significantly different perceptions?
We first consider the McGurk effect, the phenomenon by which adding a carefully
chosen video clip to the audio channel affects the viewer’s perception of what is
said [17]. We obtain empirical estimates that a significant fraction of both words
and sentences occurring in natural speech have some susceptibility to this effect.
We also learn models for predicting McGurk illusionability. Finally we demonstrate
that the Yanny or Laurel auditory illusion [24] is not an isolated occurrence by
generating several very different new instances. We believe that the surprising
density of illusionable natural speech warrants further investigation, from the
perspectives of both security and cognitive science.
1 Introduction
A growing body of work on adversarial examples has identified that for machine-learning (ML)
systems that operate on high-dimensional data, for nearly every natural input there exists a small
perturbation of the point that will be misclassified by the system, posing a threat to its deployment in
certain critical settings [3, 7, 10, 13, 16, 23, 22]. More broadly, the susceptibility of ML systems to
adversarial examples has prompted a re-examination of whether current ML systems are truly learning
or if they are assemblages of tricks that are effective yet brittle and easily fooled [25]. Implicit in this
line of reasoning is the assumption that instances of ”real" learning, such as human cognition, yield
extremely robust systems. Indeed, at least in computer vision, human perception is regarded as the
gold-standard for robustness to adversarial examples.
Evidently, humans can be fooled by a variety of illusions, whether they be optical, auditory, or
other; and there is a long line of research from the cognitive science and psychology communities
investigating these [12]. In general, however, these illusions are viewed as isolated examples that do
not arise frequently, and which are far from the instances encountered in everyday life.
In this work, we attempt to understand how susceptible humans’ perceptual systems for natural
speech are to carefully designed “adversarial attacks.” We investigate the density of certain classes of
illusion, that is, the fraction of natural language utterances whose comprehension can be affected by
the illusion. Our study centers around the McGurk effect, which is the well-studied phenomenon by
which the perception of what we hear can be influenced by what we see [17]. A prototypical example
is that the audio of the phoneme “baa,” accompanied by a video of someone mouthing “vaa”, can
be perceived as “vaa” or “gaa” (Figure 1). This effect persists even when the subject is aware of the
setup, though the strength of the effect varies significantly across people and languages and with
factors such as age, gender, and disorders [2, 8, 14, 18, 20, 21, 27, 28, 31].
Figure 1: Illustration of the McGurk effect. For some phoneme pairs, when the speaker visibly
mouths phoneme A but the auditory stimulus is actually the phoneme B, listeners tend to perceive a
phoneme C 6= B.
A significant density of illusionable instances for humans might present similar types of security risks
as adversarial examples do for ML systems. Auditory signals such as public service announcements,
instructions sent to first responders, etc., could be targeted by a malicious agent. Given only access to
a screen within eyesight of the intended victims, the agent might be able to significantly obfuscate or
alter the message perceived by those who see the screen (even peripherally).
1.1 Related work
Illusionable instances for humans are similar to adversarial examples for ML systems. Strictly
speaking, however, our investigation of the density of natural language for which McGurk illusions
can be created, is not the human analog of adversarial examples. The adversarial examples for ML
systems are datapoints that are misclassified, despite being extremely similar to a typical datapoint
(that is correctly classified). Our illusions of misdubbed audio are not extremely close to any
typically encountered input, since our McGurk samples have auditory signals corresponding to one
phoneme/word and visual signals corresponding to another. Also, there is a compelling argument for
why the McGurk confusion occurs, namely that human speech perception is bimodal (audio-visual)
in nature when lip reading is available [4, 29].
To the best of our knowledge, prior to our work, there has been little systematic investigation of
the extent to which the McGurk effect, or other types of illusions, can be made dense in the set of
instances encountered in everyday life. The closest work is Elsayed et al. [9], where the authors
demonstrate that some adversarial examples for computer vision systems also fool humans when
humans were given less than a tenth of second to view the image. However, some of these examples
seem less satisfying as the perturbation acts as a pixel-space interpolation between the original image
and the “incorrect” class. This results in images that are visually borderline between two classes, and
as such, do not provide a sense of illusion to the viewer. In general, researchers have not probed the
robustness of human perception with the same tools, intent, or perspective, with which the security
community is currently interrogating the robustness of ML systems.
2 Problem setup
For the McGurk effect, we attempt an illusion for a language token (e.g. phoneme, word, sentence) x
by creating a video where an audio stream of x is visually dubbed over by a person saying x′ 6= x.
We stress that the audio portion of the illusion is not modified and corresponds to a person saying x.
The illusion f(x′, x) affects a listener if they perceive what is being said to be y 6= x if they watched
the illusory video whereas they perceive x if they had either listened to the audio stream without
watching the video or had watched the original unaltered video, depending on specification. We call
a token illusionable if an illusion can be made for the token that affects the perception of a significant
fraction of people.
In Section 3, we analyze the extent to which the McGurk effect can be used to create illusions for
phonemes, words, and sentences, and analyze the fraction of natural language that is susceptible to
such illusionability. We thereby obtain a lower bound on the density of illusionable natural speech.
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Table 1: Illusionable phonemes and effects based on preliminary phoneme-pair testing. Where a
number of lip movements were available to affect a phoneme, the most effective one is listed.
Phoneme Lip Movement Perceived Sound
b/ /w/ /v/, /f/, /p/
D/ /b/ /b/
f/ /z/ /T/, /t/, /b/
m/ /D/ /nT/, /n/, /ml/
p/ /t/ /t/, /k/
v/ /b/ /b/
d/ /v/ /v/, /t/
l/ /v/ /v/
T/ /v/ /d/, /k/, /t/, /f/
w/ /l/ /l/
We find that 1) a significant fraction of words that occur in everyday speech can be turned into
McGurk-style illusions, 2) such illusions persist when embedded within the context of natural
sentences, and in fact affect a significant fraction of natural sentences, and 3) the illusionability of
words and sentences can be predicted using features from natural language modeling.
3 McGurk experiments
3.1 Phoneme-level experiments
We began by determining which phoneme sounds can be paired with video dubs of other phonemes
to effect a perceived phoneme that is different from the actual sound. We created McGurk videos
for all vowel pairs preceded with the consonant /n/ as well as for all consonant pairs followed by
the vowel /a/ spoken by a speaker. There are 20 vowel phonemes and 24 consonant phonemes in
American English although /Ã/ and /Z/ are redundant for our purposes.1 Based on labels provided
by 10 individuals we found that although vowels were not easily confused, there are a number of
illusionable consonants. We note that the illusionable phoneme pairs depend both on the speaker and
listener identities.
Given Table 1 of illusionable phonemes, the goal was then to understand whether these could be
leveraged within words or sentences; and if so, the fraction of natural speech that is susceptible.
3.2 Word-level experiments
We sampled 200 unique words (listed in Table 2) from the 10,000 most common words in the Project
Gutenberg novels in proportion to their frequency in the corpus. The 10k words collectively have a
prevalence of 80.6% in the corpus. Of the 200 sampled words, 147 (73.5%) contained phonemes
that our preliminary phoneme study suggested might be illusionable. For these 147 words, we paired
audio clips spoken by the speaker with illusory video dubs of the speaker saying the words with
appropriately switched out phonemes. We tested these videos on 20 naive test subjects who did not
participate in the preliminary study. Each subject watched half of the words and listened without
video to the other half of the words, and were given the instructions: "Write down what you hear.
What you hear may or may not be sensical. Also write down if a clip sounds unclear to you. Not that
a clip may sound nonsensical but clear." Subjects were allowed up to three plays of each clip.
We found that watching the illusory videos led to an average miscomprehension rate of 24.8%, a
relative 148% increase from the baseline of listening to the audio alone (Table 3). The illusory videos
made people less confident about their correct answers, with an additional 5.1% of words being heard
correctly but unclearly, compared to 2.1% for audio only. For 17% of the 200 words, the illusory
videos increased the error rates by more than 30% above the audio-only baseline.
1Refer to www.macmillanenglish.com/pronunciation/phonemic-chart-in-american-english/
for a list of the phoneme symbols of the International Phonetic Alphabet that are used in American English.
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Table 2: The 200 unique words sampled from the Project Gutenberg novel corpus. The 147 of those
for which an illusory video was created are listed on top. Ordering is otherwise alphabetical.
Il
lu
si
on
A
tt
em
pt
ed
about addressed all also and anyone arms
away bad be been before behind besides
blind bought box brothers but by call
called calling came child close coming could
days dead did die direction done else
end even everything far features fell few
fighting fly for formed from game gathered
gave general generally god good half hands
happened hath have him himself idea information
july large let letter life like list
made many mass may me meet men
months more Mrs my myself never nothing
of off old one open opinion ordinary
other outside passion perhaps please plenty point
possessed present put questions roof said save
seized shall sharp ship should slow some
speech still successful summer terms than that
the their them themselves there they things
though time top upon used very waited
was water we went what when which
will wisdom with working world would wounded
N
o
A
tt
em
pt
a act air an any are as
at change city country eyes go going
hair has he heart her higher his
house i in into is it its
king know nature new no not now
on or our out rest saw see
seen she sorrow strange take talking to
turn who writing your
Table 3: Test results for word-level McGurk illusions among the 147 words predicted to be illusionable.
Shown are average error rates for watching the illusory video vs listening to the audio only, as well as
the percentage of words that are correctly identified but sound ambiguous to the listener.
Audio Only Illusory Video Relative Increase
Words Incorrectly Identified 10.0 24.8 +148%
Words Correct with Low Confidence 2.1 5.1 +144%
3.2.1 Prediction model for word-level illusionability
To create a predictive model for word-level illusionability, we used illusionable phonemes enriched
with positional information as features. Explicitly, for each of the 10 illusionable phonemes, we
created three features from the phoneme being in an initial position (being the first phoneme of the
word), a medial position (having phonemes come before and after), or a final position (being the
last phoneme of the word). We then represented each word with a binary bag-of-words model [15],
giving each of the 30 phonemes-with-phonetic-context features a value of 1 if present in the word
and 0 otherwise. We performed ridge regression on these features with a constant term. We searched
for the optimal l2 regularization constant among the values [0.1, 1, 10, 100] and picked the optimal
one based on training set performance. The train:test split was in the proportion 85%:15% and was
randomly chosen for each trial. Across 10k randomized trials, we obtain average training and test set
correlations of 91.1± 0.6% and 44.6± 28.9% respectively.
Our final model achieves an out-of-sample correlation of 57% between predicted and observed
illusionabilites. Here, the observed illusionability of the words is calculated as the difference between
the accuracy of watchers of the illusory videos and the accuracy of listeners, where “accuracy” is
defined as the fraction of respondents who were correct. For each word, the predicted illusionability
is calculated from doing inference on that word using the averaged regression coefficients of the
regression trials where the word is not in the training set.
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Our predicted illusionability is also calibrated, in the sense that for the words predicted to have an
illusionability <0.1, the mean empirical illusionability is 0.04; for words with predicted illusionability
in the interval [0.1, 0.2] the mean empirical illusionability is 0.14; for predicted illusionability between
[0.2, 0.3] the mean observed is 0.27; and for predicted illusionability >0.3, the mean observed is 0.50.
Figure 2 visually depicts the match between the observed and predicted word illusionabilities.
Figure 2: Predicted word illusionability closely matches observed word illusionability, with out-of-
sample correlation of 57%. The words are sorted by increasing predicted word illusionability (and
the observed illusionability of each word was not used in calculating the prediction of that word).
3.3 Sentence-level experiments
We set up the following experiment on naturally occurring sentences. We randomly sampled 300
sentences of lengths 4-8 words inclusive from the novel Little Women [1] from the Project Gutenberg
corpus. From this reduced sample, we selected and perturbed 32 sentences that we expected to be
illusionable (listed in Table 4). With the speaker, we prepared two formats of each sentence: original
video (with original audio), and illusory video (with original audio).We then evaluated the perception
of these on 1306 naive test subjects on Amazon Mechanical Turk.
The Turkers were shown videos for six randomly selected sentences, three illusory and three original,
and were given the prompt: "Press any key to begin video [index #] of 6. Watch the whole video,
and then you will be prompted to write down what the speaker said." Only one viewing of any clip
was allowed, to simulate the natural setting of observing a live audio/video stream. Each Turker was
limited to six videos to reduce respondent fatigue. Turkers were also asked to report their level of
confidence in what they heard on a scale from no uncertainty (0%) to complete uncertainty (100%).
One hundred and twelve Turkers (8.6%) did not adhere to the prompt, writing unrelated responses,
and their results were omitted from analysis.
We found that watching the illusory videos led to an average miscomprehension rate of 32.8%, a
relative 145% increase from the baseline of watching the original videos (Table 5). The illusory
videos made people less confident about their correct answers. Turkers who correctly identified the
audio message in an illusory video self-reported an average uncertainty of 42.9%, which is a relative
123% higher than the average reported by the Turkers who correctly understood the original videos.
Examples of mistakes made by listeners of the illusory videos are shown in Table 6. Overall we
found that for 11.5% of the 200 sampled sentences (23 out of the 30 videos we created), the illusory
videos increased the error rates by more than 10%.
3.3.1 Comparing word-level and sentence-level illusionabilities
We obtained a sentence-level illusionability prediction model with an out-of-sample correlation of 33%
between predicted and observed illusionabilities. Here, the observed illusionability of the sentences
was calculated as the difference between the accuracy of watchers of the illusory videos and the
accuracy of watchers of original videos, where “accuracy” is defined as the fraction of respondents
who were correct. We obtained predicted illusionabilities by simply using the maximum word
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Table 4: The sentences randomly sampled from Little Women for which we made illusory videos.
Those that had observed illusionability >0.1 are listed on top.
Illusionable
I’m not too proud to beg for Father. No need of that.
I’d like to wear them, Mother can I? It’s no harm, Jo
Now do be still, and stop bothering. Well, I like that!
How many did you have out? Open the door, Amy!
Nonsense, that’s of no use. I am glad of that!
Of course that settled it. I can’t bear saints.
Serves me right for trying to be fine. Of course I am!
There’s gratitude for you! That’s my good girl.
Capital boys, aren’t they? You’ve got me, anyhow.
Brown, that is, sometimes. I’ll tell you some day.
What do you know about him? He won’t do that.
The plan of going over was not forgotten.
Not Illusionable
On the way get these things. I’m glad of it.
Aren’t you going with him? Then I’ll tell you.
That was the question. That’s why I do it.
I hate to have odd gloves! We don’t know him!
What good times they had, to be sure
Table 5: Test results for sentence-level McGurk illusions, showing average error rates for watching
the illusory video vs watching the original video, and average self-reported uncertainty for correctly
identified words.
Original Video Illusory Video Relative Increase
Sentences Incorrectly Identified 13.4% 32.8% +145%
Uncertainty of Correct Sentences 19.4% 42.9% +121%
Table 6: Sample verbatim mistakes for sentence-level McGurk illusions. Spelling mistakes were
ignored for accuracy calculations. Sample illusory videos are provided in the supplementary files.
Sentence Sample Listener Perceptions
Serves me right for trying to be fine. Serves thee right for trying to be thine
Serve you right for trying to be kind
serbes ye right shine by rhine
Of course that settled it. up course bat saddle it
Of course Max settled it.
I can’t bear saints. I can’t wear skates
I can’t hear saints.
I can’t spare sink
How many did you have out? How many did you knock out?
How many did you help out
I’ll tell you some day. I’ll tell you Sunday.
Ill tell you something
I’m not too proud to beg for Father. I’m not too proud to beg or bother
I want the crowd to beg for father
Ine not too proud to beg for father
Well, I like that! Well I like pets
Well, I like baths
Now do be still, and stop bothering. now do we still end stop bothering
And do we still end sauce watering?
Of course I am! Of course I an
Of course I can
Of course I anth.
You’ve got me, anyhow. you got knee anyhow
You got the anyhow.
There’s gratitude for you! Bears gratitude for you.
Pairs gratitudes or you.
Bears gratitude lore you
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illusionability prediction amongst the words in each sentence, with word predictions obtained from
the word-level model. We attempted to improve our sentence-level predictive model by incorporating
how likely the words appear under a natural language distribution, considering three classes of words:
words in the sentence for which no illusion was attempted, the words for which an illusion was
attempted, and the potentially perceived words for words for which an illusion was attempted. We
used log word frequencies obtained from the the top 36.7k most common words from the Project
Gutenberg corpus.2 This approach could not attain better out-of-sample correlations than the naive
method. This implies that context is important for sentence-level illusionability, and more complex
language models should be used.
Finally, comparing word-level and sentence-level McGurk illusionabilities in natural speech, we
observe that that the former is significantly higher. A greater McGurk effect at the word level
is to be expected–sentences provide context with which the viewer could fill in confusions and
misunderstandings. Furthermore, when watching a sentence video compared to a short word video,
the viewer’s attention is more likely to stray, both from the visual component of the video, which
evidently reduces the McGurk effect, as well as the from the audio component, which likely prompts
the viewer to rely even more heavily on context. Nevertheless, there remains a significant amount of
illusionability at the sentence-level.
4 Future Directions
This work is an initial step towards exploring the density of illusionable phenomena for humans.
There are many natural directions for future work. In the vein of further understanding McGurk-style
illusions, it seems worth building more accurate predictive models for sentence-level effects, and
further investigating the security risks posed by McGurk illusions. For example, one concrete next
step in understanding McGurk-style illusions would be to actually implement a system which takes
an audio input, and outputs a video dub resulting in significant misunderstanding. Such a system
would need to combine a high-quality speech-to-video-synthesis system [30, 32], with a fleshed-out
language model and McGurk prediction model.
There is also the question of how to guard against “attacks” on human perception. For example, in
the case of the McGurk effect, how can one rephrase a passage of text in such a way that the meaning
is unchanged, but the rephrased text is significantly more robust to McGurk style manipulations? The
central question in this direction is what fraction of natural language can be made robust without
significantly changing the semantics.
A better understanding of when and why certain human perception systems are nonrobust can also
be applied to make ML systems more robust. In particular, neural networks have been found to
be susceptible to adversarial examples in automatic speech recognition [26, 5] and to the McGurk
effect [19], and a rudimentary approach to making language robust to the latter problem would be
to use a reduced vocabulary that avoids words that score highly in our word-level illusionability
prediction model. Relatedly, at the interface of cognitive science and adversarial examples, there has
been work suggesting that humans can anticipate when or how machines will misclassify, including
for adversarial examples [6, 11, 33].
More broadly, as the tools for probing the weaknesses of ML systems develop further, it seems like a
natural time to reexamine the supposed robustness of human perception. We anticipate unexpected
findings. To provide one example, we summarize some preliminary results on audio-only illusions.
4.1 Auditory Illusions
An audio clip of the word “Laurel" gained widespread attention in 2018, with coverage by notable
news outlets such as The New York Times and Time. Roughly half of listeners perceive “Laurel” and
the other half perceive “Yanny” or similar-sounding words, with high confidence on both sides [24].
One of the reasons the public was intrigued is because examples of such phenomena are viewed as
rare, isolated instances. In a preliminary attempt to investigate the density of such phenomena, we
identified five additional distinct examples (Table 7). The supplementary files include 10 versions
of one of these examples, where listeners tend to perceive either “worlds” or “yikes.” Across the
2https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Wiktionary:Frequency_lists#Project_Gutenberg
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different audio clips, one should be able to hear both interpretations. The threshold for switching
from one interpretation to another differs from person to person.
Table 7: Test results for Yanny/Laurel style illusions. Each row displays a cluster of similar-sounding
reported words, with counts. Emdashes indicate unintelligible.
Word Slowdown Perceived Sound N
worlds 1.5x worlds 5
yikes/yites 4
nights/lights 6
bologna 1.7x bologna 2
alarming 2
alarmy/ayarmy/ignore me 3
uoomi/ayomi/wyoming 3
anomi/anolli/amomi 3
– 2
growing 1.3x growing 8
pearling 3
curling 3
crowing 1
potent 1.7x potent/poatin/poden 4
pogie/bowie/po-ee 3
pone/paam/paan 3
power/poder/pair 3
tana 1
– 2
prologue 1.9x prologue 2
prelude/pro-why/pinelog 3
kayak/kayank/kayan 6
turnip/tienap/tarzan 3
– 1
These examples were generated by examining 5000 words, and selecting the 50 whose spectrograms
contain a balance of high and low frequency components that most closely matched those for the
word “Laurel". Each audio file corresponded to the Google Cloud Text-to-Speech API synthesis of a
word, after low frequencies were damped and the audio was slowed 1.3-1.9x. After listening to these
top 50 candidates, we evaluated the most promising five on a set of 15 individuals (3 female, 12 male,
age range 22-33). We found multiple distributional modes of perceptions for all five audio clips. For
example, a clip of “worlds” with the high frequencies damped and slowed down 1.5x was perceived
by five listeners as “worlds”, four as “yikes/yites” and six as “nights/lights”. While these experiments
do not demonstrate a density of such examples with respect to the set of all words—and it is unlikely
that illusory audio tracks in this style can be created for the majority of words—they illustrate that
even the surprising Yanny or Laurel phenomenon is not an isolated occurrence. It remains to be seen
how dense such phenomena can be, given the right sort of subtle audio manipulation. ‘
5 Conclusion
Our work suggests that for a significant fraction of natural speech, human perception can be altered
by using subtle, learnable perturbations. This is an initial step towards exploring the density of
illusionable phenomenon for humans, and examining the extent to which human perception may be
vulnerable to security risks like those that adversarial examples present for ML systems.
We hope our work inspires future investigations into the discovery, generation, and quantification
of multimodal and unimodal audiovisual and auditory illusions for humans. There exist many open
research questions on when and why humans are susceptible to various types of illusions, how to
model the illusionability of natural language, and how natural language can be made more robust
to illusory perturbations. Additionally, we hope such investigations inform our interpretations of
the strengths and weaknesses of current ML systems. Finally, there is the possibility that some
vulnerability to carefully crafted adversarial examples may be inherent to all complex learning
systems that interact with high-dimensional inputs in an environment with limited data; any thorough
investigation of this question must also probe the human cognitive system.
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